Case Studies
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To better understand how to implement light rail and streetcar systems in metropolitan Cincinnati, it is useful to look at how other cities have implemented rail transit in recent history. We examined the streetcar systems in Boston, Detroit, Memphis, Portland, Seattle, and Tampa; as well as the light rail systems in Buffalo, Edmonton, San Diego, and St. Louis.
These selections ensured a good overview of how cities with varying demographics and densities implemented streetcar transit in their particular circumstance. Buffalo and St. Louis were chosen specifically since they face problems which are similar to those faced by Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky (such as declining downtown populations).
Each case study gives us a better look at how rail transit was implemented in other cities and certain patterns emerge that differentiate between more and less successful transit projects. Understanding the patterns of best practices that emerge from the case studies is important so that we may learn from the successes and mistakes of other cities. This article concludes with a review of best practices for planning streetcar and light rail systems.
These selections ensured a good overview of how cities with varying demographics and densities implemented streetcar transit in their particular circumstance. Buffalo and St. Louis were chosen specifically since they face problems which are similar to those faced by Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky (such as declining downtown populations).
Each case study gives us a better look at how rail transit was implemented in other cities and certain patterns emerge that differentiate between more and less successful transit projects. Understanding the patterns of best practices that emerge from the case studies is important so that we may learn from the successes and mistakes of other cities. This article concludes with a review of best practices for planning streetcar and light rail systems.
Streetcar Systems
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The Seattle and Portland streetcars are similar in terms of their purposes: they each have a line that serves as a downtown circulator that connects people to major destinations, such as universities or the waterfront. Both Seattle and Portland also have light rail systems that serve as commuter transit, strengthening their dedication to multi-modal transportation and making both systems convenient to the passenger. Both systems are generally regarded as successful, and are often cited for examples of best practices (Keen 2010; Davila 2013). Still, directly applying lessons from Seattle and Portland to Cincinnati's case is difficult, since both Seattle and Portland are situated in the more dynamic, high growth Pacific North-west region.
The Boston streetcar is another example of a successful system, but drawing lessons from it for Cincinnati is also difficult, but for reasons different than Seattle and Portland's. Boston’s system has been in continuous operation for over a hundred years, making it a unique case study, and the city has a much more dense settlement pattern than that of Cincinnati. Boston has developed in response to having a good rail transit system throughout its history; the survival of Boston's streetcar lines is also the result of a simple, pragmatic transit solution, as the streetcars were able to maneuver tight spaces which traditional city buses were unable to (Jaffe 2011). Although many lines have been shut down over the years for economic reasons, Boston’s system still has a large ridership base.
The Memphis streetcar, or trolley, was conceived of as an economic development tool to revitalize a failing, downtown 1970s mall (Czarnecky 2003, 73). It shares some right-of-way with Amtrak and has its own right of way in other places (a typical cost saving feature for developing new rail transit) (Czarnecky 2003, 71-72). Its stations are at major points of interest and the system also features connections with other modes of transportation, which is key to successful streetcar transit and transit-oriented development in general. The Memphis trolley was part of a larger downtown revitalization plan and is regarded as an economic success, although its ridership rates are quite low in comparison with some of our other case studies (APTA 2013). This is partially due to Memphis’ low densities, but also is related to the system's size, which consists of three fairly short lines, covering about ten miles total, parts of which are redundant, as different lines run on the same stretch of track in places (MATA 2014).
Tampa's modern streetcar system is considerably less successful than the other three, and is generally considered a failure; so much so that it is often cited by streetcar opponents as a reason modern streetcars are boondoggles (Scheib 2012b). Tampa’s old streetcar system was scarcely used after World War II, so, like many systems across the U.S., service stopped. In the 1990s, support for a streetcar was recognized and the Downtown Transportation Master Plan recommended preserving the line from downtown to Ybor City (Carroll n.d.). The idea was there, but the execution was very poor. The system was marketed as a downtown employment circulator, but it mainly used by tourists, for special events, or, more usually, not at all (Scheib 2012b). Tampa’s system also had a very limited operating schedule and did not operate in the morning, so it could not be used as a daily commuter service even if someone desired to use it for that purpose; limited hours of operation partially explain the system's plummeting ridership numbers (Scheib 2012a).
Detroit's now defunct historic trolley, like Tampa's streetcar, was a flop (albeit, a less expensive one). The vintage trolleys were acquired from many countries from around the world and the system was used occasionally by tourists and convention-goers, or, again, no one (Czarnecky 2003, 68-69). Detroit's historic trolley system also had an extremely short track length (1 miles) and a fairly limited operating schedule (RPR Consulting 2010). The main reason it failed is because Detroit's transit authority constructed its People Mover (an elevated light rail system), which directly competed with the trolley for riders and quickly rendered it superfluous in the city's overall public transit system (Czarnecky 2003, 69-71). Although the People Mover has its share of problems too, it does go where many people want to go, and it is used as a functional commuter line and a downtown circulator for Detroit’s residents.
The Boston streetcar is another example of a successful system, but drawing lessons from it for Cincinnati is also difficult, but for reasons different than Seattle and Portland's. Boston’s system has been in continuous operation for over a hundred years, making it a unique case study, and the city has a much more dense settlement pattern than that of Cincinnati. Boston has developed in response to having a good rail transit system throughout its history; the survival of Boston's streetcar lines is also the result of a simple, pragmatic transit solution, as the streetcars were able to maneuver tight spaces which traditional city buses were unable to (Jaffe 2011). Although many lines have been shut down over the years for economic reasons, Boston’s system still has a large ridership base.
The Memphis streetcar, or trolley, was conceived of as an economic development tool to revitalize a failing, downtown 1970s mall (Czarnecky 2003, 73). It shares some right-of-way with Amtrak and has its own right of way in other places (a typical cost saving feature for developing new rail transit) (Czarnecky 2003, 71-72). Its stations are at major points of interest and the system also features connections with other modes of transportation, which is key to successful streetcar transit and transit-oriented development in general. The Memphis trolley was part of a larger downtown revitalization plan and is regarded as an economic success, although its ridership rates are quite low in comparison with some of our other case studies (APTA 2013). This is partially due to Memphis’ low densities, but also is related to the system's size, which consists of three fairly short lines, covering about ten miles total, parts of which are redundant, as different lines run on the same stretch of track in places (MATA 2014).
Tampa's modern streetcar system is considerably less successful than the other three, and is generally considered a failure; so much so that it is often cited by streetcar opponents as a reason modern streetcars are boondoggles (Scheib 2012b). Tampa’s old streetcar system was scarcely used after World War II, so, like many systems across the U.S., service stopped. In the 1990s, support for a streetcar was recognized and the Downtown Transportation Master Plan recommended preserving the line from downtown to Ybor City (Carroll n.d.). The idea was there, but the execution was very poor. The system was marketed as a downtown employment circulator, but it mainly used by tourists, for special events, or, more usually, not at all (Scheib 2012b). Tampa’s system also had a very limited operating schedule and did not operate in the morning, so it could not be used as a daily commuter service even if someone desired to use it for that purpose; limited hours of operation partially explain the system's plummeting ridership numbers (Scheib 2012a).
Detroit's now defunct historic trolley, like Tampa's streetcar, was a flop (albeit, a less expensive one). The vintage trolleys were acquired from many countries from around the world and the system was used occasionally by tourists and convention-goers, or, again, no one (Czarnecky 2003, 68-69). Detroit's historic trolley system also had an extremely short track length (1 miles) and a fairly limited operating schedule (RPR Consulting 2010). The main reason it failed is because Detroit's transit authority constructed its People Mover (an elevated light rail system), which directly competed with the trolley for riders and quickly rendered it superfluous in the city's overall public transit system (Czarnecky 2003, 69-71). Although the People Mover has its share of problems too, it does go where many people want to go, and it is used as a functional commuter line and a downtown circulator for Detroit’s residents.
Not even the last operational double-decker trolley could save Detroit's streetcar.
Image source: Breen-Bondie 2009
Image source: Breen-Bondie 2009
Light Rail Systems
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San Diego operates one of the oldest light rail systems
to be implemented in the US, as prior to the late 1970s, rail transit
in the US mostly consisted of streetcars and heavy rail systems. An early compliant
of San Diego's system was that it 'skimmed the cream' off the city's existing bus
system by taking its most heavily traveled and profitable routes (Gomez-ibanez 1985). This is a common criticism of light rail transit, due to the fact that system routes need to be situated on the most heavily utilized transit lines to make the investment in more intensive transit economically viable. Still, the system has been a success for the city. As of 2013, the San Diego light rail system had an average of about 122,000 riders per weekday, making it the fourth busiest system in the country by this metric (APTA 2013).
The St. Louis light rail system is truly regional in scope, connecting suburban destinations in Illinois and Missouri through downtown St. Louis. The system was designed mostly as a commuter line and took advantage of abandoned railroad right-of-ways and tunnels, thus minimizing initial construction and land acquisition costs (Steckler and Michalovic n.d.). Although first opened in 1993, the system has been expanded on an almost continuous basis, thus building network connectivity and stressing inter-modal transit opportunities (for example, there are many large park-and-ride facilities and connections to local buses adjacent to rail stations). Jumps in property values based on proximity to light rail stations are particularly high in the case of St. Louis, around 32% (Garrett 2004, 21).
Buffalo’s light rail system actually resembles heavy rail in many respects, namely because much of its line runs at up to 50 MPH in subway tunnels (Gellin n.d.). Like many rail transit systems, it was built as a supporting element of a downtown economic development plan. In this case the system was centered around a 1980s downtown pedestrian mall, but it also connected other points around the city, like its downtown arena and nearby university (Gellin n.d.). Unfortunately for Buffalo, its system was built on the cusp of a rapid and unforeseen decline in the city’s population and stagnation of growth of its suburbs (Gellin n.d.). Thus the line remains as it was built, and its ridership rates are quite low in comparison with other similar systems (APTA 2013). Despite the system’s limited success, it has still exerted modestly positive effects on property values that are in close proximity to its stations (about a 3.5% increase) (Hess and Almeida 2007).
In 1978, Edmonton became the first city with a population of less than one million to build a light rail system (Edmonton Transit System 2004). Although ridership gains in public transit increased about by 19% for the city, due to the construction of its light rail system, there was also an 8% average annual increase in costs per passenger after the system was installed; however, the actual total increase in costs may have been as much as 40%, representing a considerable subsidy (Gomez-ibanez 1985). Like Buffalo's system, much of the tracks in the city's central business district are underground, making it difficult to expand Edmonton's system to its suburbs (Gomez-ibanez 1985). Still, it is considered a successful system for a city its size, with a daily ridership of about 93,000 passengers as of 2011 (City of Edmonton 2011).
The St. Louis light rail system is truly regional in scope, connecting suburban destinations in Illinois and Missouri through downtown St. Louis. The system was designed mostly as a commuter line and took advantage of abandoned railroad right-of-ways and tunnels, thus minimizing initial construction and land acquisition costs (Steckler and Michalovic n.d.). Although first opened in 1993, the system has been expanded on an almost continuous basis, thus building network connectivity and stressing inter-modal transit opportunities (for example, there are many large park-and-ride facilities and connections to local buses adjacent to rail stations). Jumps in property values based on proximity to light rail stations are particularly high in the case of St. Louis, around 32% (Garrett 2004, 21).
Buffalo’s light rail system actually resembles heavy rail in many respects, namely because much of its line runs at up to 50 MPH in subway tunnels (Gellin n.d.). Like many rail transit systems, it was built as a supporting element of a downtown economic development plan. In this case the system was centered around a 1980s downtown pedestrian mall, but it also connected other points around the city, like its downtown arena and nearby university (Gellin n.d.). Unfortunately for Buffalo, its system was built on the cusp of a rapid and unforeseen decline in the city’s population and stagnation of growth of its suburbs (Gellin n.d.). Thus the line remains as it was built, and its ridership rates are quite low in comparison with other similar systems (APTA 2013). Despite the system’s limited success, it has still exerted modestly positive effects on property values that are in close proximity to its stations (about a 3.5% increase) (Hess and Almeida 2007).
In 1978, Edmonton became the first city with a population of less than one million to build a light rail system (Edmonton Transit System 2004). Although ridership gains in public transit increased about by 19% for the city, due to the construction of its light rail system, there was also an 8% average annual increase in costs per passenger after the system was installed; however, the actual total increase in costs may have been as much as 40%, representing a considerable subsidy (Gomez-ibanez 1985). Like Buffalo's system, much of the tracks in the city's central business district are underground, making it difficult to expand Edmonton's system to its suburbs (Gomez-ibanez 1985). Still, it is considered a successful system for a city its size, with a daily ridership of about 93,000 passengers as of 2011 (City of Edmonton 2011).
Network and Line Expansion
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In addition to understanding the dynamics of existing streetcar and light rail systems, it is also important to understand how rail transit networks are expanded on over time, since this will be the case in Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky (which has its start with the Cincinnati Streetcar).
One of the more important metrics for understanding if rail transit projects work as functional transit is if the lines have been expanded on over time. This is an important distinguishment, since even projects that have never been expanded on, and have comparatively poor ridership rates, can still have some positive economic effects on a community (for example, Buffalo's light rail line) (Hess and Almeida 2007). An irony of transit-oriented developments is that they do not actually require excellent transit service or quality at their core to still work as an economic development catalyst for the areas served by the transit (Jaffe 2013a). To that end, one of the first steps when considering network expansion is to see if simply improving the operating schedule, system cars, or the service's marketing can attract more riders to existing lines, potentially saving on the large capital costs of expanding rail lines altogether (Lesley 2011, 147).
Still, in some cases, expansion to new areas is extremely desirable and a viable option. Most of the case studies reviewed have been expanded on over time, with the more successful systems (for example, the Portland and Seattle streetcars) being expanded on more aggressively than the less successful systems (Tampa and Detroit's streetcars). These successful systems have high levels of network synergy, meaning that new expansions on these systems will draw incrementally more users into the system, especially as interchanges via free (or low-cost) transfers are streamlined and made easy for passengers (Lesley 2011, 25). Still, there are diminishing returns from network expansion (Lesley 2011, 26). Diminishing returns, coupled with the very high capital costs of expansion, and continued competition with the private automobile, suggest that rail transit networks will never be as dense as they were in the first half of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, expanding an existing system is generally easier than establishing a new system altogether (one need look no further than Cincinnati to see the anxiety, waffling, and posturing related to creating an all-new rail transit systems); lessons will have been learned from the first line(s) and the investment can be made with a higher degree of confidence for all parties involved (Lesley 2011, 149). Some general patterns and dynamics exist that can be observed as streetcar and light rail systems expand their networks. Expansions tend to 'spur' off existing main lines to connect with new, strategic locations and these spurs are often short in comparison with the initial length of the system. This is the case in both Memphis' streetcar, where the newest line is a short spur that terminates at the city's Medical Center, and also in St. Louis' light rail system, where a new line connects Washington University, a popular shopping center, and a few suburbs. This is in contrast to Cincinnati's streetcar system, which has a small initial line; suggesting that any network expansion to the Cincinnati streetcar will likely be as long or longer than the initial line.
It's also not uncommon for parts of entire new lines to run on existing track, duplicating existing services, but also improving the system's operating schedule and convenience for its users. This is also the case in Memphis and St. Louis' systems, and is epitomized by the 'Loop' of Chicago's elevated heavy rail system, where certain stations connect to up to five different lines.
The only one of our case studies which has not been expanded on at all is Buffalo's light rail system, which has comparatively low ridership rates which peaked early in the history of the system. Still, a few other poor-performing systems have seen only miniscule expansions in their lines, both the streetcars in Tampa and Detroit have seen less than a half mile in track expansion since they opened service (TECO Line Streetcar System 2012; RPR Consulting 2010). Network expansion is generally related to strong ridership rates and demand, as it would usually be an unpopular move for politicians to invest large sums of public funds in transit systems with few users (and therefore few votes).
One of the more important metrics for understanding if rail transit projects work as functional transit is if the lines have been expanded on over time. This is an important distinguishment, since even projects that have never been expanded on, and have comparatively poor ridership rates, can still have some positive economic effects on a community (for example, Buffalo's light rail line) (Hess and Almeida 2007). An irony of transit-oriented developments is that they do not actually require excellent transit service or quality at their core to still work as an economic development catalyst for the areas served by the transit (Jaffe 2013a). To that end, one of the first steps when considering network expansion is to see if simply improving the operating schedule, system cars, or the service's marketing can attract more riders to existing lines, potentially saving on the large capital costs of expanding rail lines altogether (Lesley 2011, 147).
Still, in some cases, expansion to new areas is extremely desirable and a viable option. Most of the case studies reviewed have been expanded on over time, with the more successful systems (for example, the Portland and Seattle streetcars) being expanded on more aggressively than the less successful systems (Tampa and Detroit's streetcars). These successful systems have high levels of network synergy, meaning that new expansions on these systems will draw incrementally more users into the system, especially as interchanges via free (or low-cost) transfers are streamlined and made easy for passengers (Lesley 2011, 25). Still, there are diminishing returns from network expansion (Lesley 2011, 26). Diminishing returns, coupled with the very high capital costs of expansion, and continued competition with the private automobile, suggest that rail transit networks will never be as dense as they were in the first half of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, expanding an existing system is generally easier than establishing a new system altogether (one need look no further than Cincinnati to see the anxiety, waffling, and posturing related to creating an all-new rail transit systems); lessons will have been learned from the first line(s) and the investment can be made with a higher degree of confidence for all parties involved (Lesley 2011, 149). Some general patterns and dynamics exist that can be observed as streetcar and light rail systems expand their networks. Expansions tend to 'spur' off existing main lines to connect with new, strategic locations and these spurs are often short in comparison with the initial length of the system. This is the case in both Memphis' streetcar, where the newest line is a short spur that terminates at the city's Medical Center, and also in St. Louis' light rail system, where a new line connects Washington University, a popular shopping center, and a few suburbs. This is in contrast to Cincinnati's streetcar system, which has a small initial line; suggesting that any network expansion to the Cincinnati streetcar will likely be as long or longer than the initial line.
It's also not uncommon for parts of entire new lines to run on existing track, duplicating existing services, but also improving the system's operating schedule and convenience for its users. This is also the case in Memphis and St. Louis' systems, and is epitomized by the 'Loop' of Chicago's elevated heavy rail system, where certain stations connect to up to five different lines.
The only one of our case studies which has not been expanded on at all is Buffalo's light rail system, which has comparatively low ridership rates which peaked early in the history of the system. Still, a few other poor-performing systems have seen only miniscule expansions in their lines, both the streetcars in Tampa and Detroit have seen less than a half mile in track expansion since they opened service (TECO Line Streetcar System 2012; RPR Consulting 2010). Network expansion is generally related to strong ridership rates and demand, as it would usually be an unpopular move for politicians to invest large sums of public funds in transit systems with few users (and therefore few votes).
Best Practices
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We can take away a few key aspects of these case studies that will help steer transit in Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky in a successful direction.
First, having well planned destinations and good network connectivity is of the utmost importance. Moving people from their home, to their job, to the park, to the store, to the movie theater is what people want from transit service. There's a strong relationship between connectivity and transit systems that work well and are expanded on over time. Also, few cities can rely strictly on tourism to sustain their rail transit services over time; attracting locals, especially daily commuters is key.
Second, planning for multi-modal transportation that supports rail transit is crucial for its success, especially in a setting with only moderate levels of densities. Streetcar and light rail systems that have stations with easy to access connections with other modes of transportation (pedestrian, bicycle, other types of rail, car, ferry etc.) tend to be more successful, both in terms of ridership rates and spin-off economic benefits, because they are easy to get to and use.
Third, the most successful streetcar and light rail systems are located in growing cities or areas that have very high population densities. Take Boston for example: its population density is about 12,800 persons per square mile, whereas Tampa’s is only about 3,000 people per square mile (US Bureau of the Census 2014a and 2014b). While Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky do not have the population densities of big cities like Boston or Seattle, there are viable pockets of density, both in terms of residents and jobs, in the urban core that could support a streetcar or light rail system (or both). Recent trends also suggest a strong desire in young people and the elderly to move back into center cities and more compact developments. These levels of density are more able to support more intensive transit options. If these trends continue, we could see increases in density that would make implementing streetcar and light rail systems increasingly appealing in our region.
Fourth, almost all transit rail projects provide spin-off economic development benefits to the areas they directly serve. Even Buffalo’s small and underutilized light rail system boosts residential property values near stations by about 3.5% (Hess and Almeida 2007). Still, the best returns generally come from systems that are implemented as part of a broader economic development plan that support an already vibrant urban area, strong public policy support for streetcar and light rail systems is fundamental to the success of the system (Jaffe 2013a). For example: Portland’s system, which has strong backing of its residents and politicians, provides a 10.6% increase to adjacent residential property values (HDR 2007). Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky can expect similar benefits; HDR predicts the percentage of property value increase for Cincinnati’s streetcar system to be about 5%, depending on the area of the city in question (HDR 2007).
Lastly, any transit system must operate at consistent and frequent times to be successful. If people know that they can wait at a stop and be picked up within about ten minutes, they are much more likely to use transit than rely on their own automobile (Lesley 2011, 34). A common trap in failing streetcar systems is that as ridership use declines, cuts in schedules are made to save on the operations budget; however, doing so only further decreases ridership demand (since the service is deemed less appealing by its users) and the decline of ridership becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The infrequent operation schedules in Tampa and Detroit's systems had a very negative impact on their ridership rates and on the overall appeal of the system.
In summary, the main points for streetcar and light rail advocates in Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky to take away from these case studies are that the routes developed need to have desirable destinations; that these types of systems work best when supporting multi-modal transportation options; that streetcar and light rail systems work best in high density settings (be they residential or commercial); that they consistently have spin-off economic development potential; and that a consistent and frequent operating schedule is also key to a system’s success.
First, having well planned destinations and good network connectivity is of the utmost importance. Moving people from their home, to their job, to the park, to the store, to the movie theater is what people want from transit service. There's a strong relationship between connectivity and transit systems that work well and are expanded on over time. Also, few cities can rely strictly on tourism to sustain their rail transit services over time; attracting locals, especially daily commuters is key.
Second, planning for multi-modal transportation that supports rail transit is crucial for its success, especially in a setting with only moderate levels of densities. Streetcar and light rail systems that have stations with easy to access connections with other modes of transportation (pedestrian, bicycle, other types of rail, car, ferry etc.) tend to be more successful, both in terms of ridership rates and spin-off economic benefits, because they are easy to get to and use.
Third, the most successful streetcar and light rail systems are located in growing cities or areas that have very high population densities. Take Boston for example: its population density is about 12,800 persons per square mile, whereas Tampa’s is only about 3,000 people per square mile (US Bureau of the Census 2014a and 2014b). While Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky do not have the population densities of big cities like Boston or Seattle, there are viable pockets of density, both in terms of residents and jobs, in the urban core that could support a streetcar or light rail system (or both). Recent trends also suggest a strong desire in young people and the elderly to move back into center cities and more compact developments. These levels of density are more able to support more intensive transit options. If these trends continue, we could see increases in density that would make implementing streetcar and light rail systems increasingly appealing in our region.
Fourth, almost all transit rail projects provide spin-off economic development benefits to the areas they directly serve. Even Buffalo’s small and underutilized light rail system boosts residential property values near stations by about 3.5% (Hess and Almeida 2007). Still, the best returns generally come from systems that are implemented as part of a broader economic development plan that support an already vibrant urban area, strong public policy support for streetcar and light rail systems is fundamental to the success of the system (Jaffe 2013a). For example: Portland’s system, which has strong backing of its residents and politicians, provides a 10.6% increase to adjacent residential property values (HDR 2007). Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky can expect similar benefits; HDR predicts the percentage of property value increase for Cincinnati’s streetcar system to be about 5%, depending on the area of the city in question (HDR 2007).
Lastly, any transit system must operate at consistent and frequent times to be successful. If people know that they can wait at a stop and be picked up within about ten minutes, they are much more likely to use transit than rely on their own automobile (Lesley 2011, 34). A common trap in failing streetcar systems is that as ridership use declines, cuts in schedules are made to save on the operations budget; however, doing so only further decreases ridership demand (since the service is deemed less appealing by its users) and the decline of ridership becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The infrequent operation schedules in Tampa and Detroit's systems had a very negative impact on their ridership rates and on the overall appeal of the system.
In summary, the main points for streetcar and light rail advocates in Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky to take away from these case studies are that the routes developed need to have desirable destinations; that these types of systems work best when supporting multi-modal transportation options; that streetcar and light rail systems work best in high density settings (be they residential or commercial); that they consistently have spin-off economic development potential; and that a consistent and frequent operating schedule is also key to a system’s success.