"A Desire Named Streetcar, Fantasy and Fact in Rail Transit Planning” by Don Pickrell
The main issues according to Pickrell are: Forecasts led eight US cities contemplating streetcars to overestimate ridership and underestimate construction costs and operating expenses, which reflected the expectations of planners; and the structure of federal transit programs does not provide incentives to seek accurate information in evaluating alternatives. Bias towards high capital transit is unlikely to be eliminated without restructuring federal transit grant programs and local financing option.
Pickrell explains why being accurate is important in forecasting and why it is difficult to be accurate. These projects are often one of the largest investments in public works a city has ever done. Studies need a narrow forecast margin to be accurate. The current process to plan a major public works investment is very similar to the rational planning model. Washington D.C.’s was the only streetcar with more than ½ of its ridership forecast level. This was due to the increase in employment downtown by 25%. Atlanta was the only city that exceeded weekday forecasts.
Rail ridership tends to consist mostly of former bus riders. New rail lines do not reduce congestion and pollution as much as is hoped. This is where forecasting tends to meet expectations of planners more than accurately predicting the outcome.
Three critical inputs of forecasting ridership:
1. Demographic factors (population, employment, etc.)
2. Level of transit service expected (frequency, speed, etc.)
3. Speed, cost, convenience of operating and parking automobiles (a streetcars’ main competitor)
In summation, concern over escalating energy prices in the 1970s led planners to overestimate automobile costs. Project costs were overrun (for capital) in 7 of 8 cases. Capital costs included right of ways, design and engineering, construction of facilities, and vehicles and equipment. Operating expenses are often much higher than forecasted as well. The maximum local dollars contributed was surprisingly minimal. Due to the federal government taking up much of the overrun costs, local planners did not manage these projects and budgets carefully. Since the funding structure is similar today, we can assume that this is still the case to some degree. Competition between cities for federal money partly leads to over-optimism. This is why the financial risk should be transferred to the local government. However, since there have been many rail projects implemented over the past several decades, forecasts are very likely more accurate today than they were a few decades ago, barring the fact that forecasting always has a margin of error anyways. This article is important to keep in mind when researching statistics and funding sources for rail projects so that you keep an objective view of the project.
Pickrell explains why being accurate is important in forecasting and why it is difficult to be accurate. These projects are often one of the largest investments in public works a city has ever done. Studies need a narrow forecast margin to be accurate. The current process to plan a major public works investment is very similar to the rational planning model. Washington D.C.’s was the only streetcar with more than ½ of its ridership forecast level. This was due to the increase in employment downtown by 25%. Atlanta was the only city that exceeded weekday forecasts.
Rail ridership tends to consist mostly of former bus riders. New rail lines do not reduce congestion and pollution as much as is hoped. This is where forecasting tends to meet expectations of planners more than accurately predicting the outcome.
Three critical inputs of forecasting ridership:
1. Demographic factors (population, employment, etc.)
2. Level of transit service expected (frequency, speed, etc.)
3. Speed, cost, convenience of operating and parking automobiles (a streetcars’ main competitor)
In summation, concern over escalating energy prices in the 1970s led planners to overestimate automobile costs. Project costs were overrun (for capital) in 7 of 8 cases. Capital costs included right of ways, design and engineering, construction of facilities, and vehicles and equipment. Operating expenses are often much higher than forecasted as well. The maximum local dollars contributed was surprisingly minimal. Due to the federal government taking up much of the overrun costs, local planners did not manage these projects and budgets carefully. Since the funding structure is similar today, we can assume that this is still the case to some degree. Competition between cities for federal money partly leads to over-optimism. This is why the financial risk should be transferred to the local government. However, since there have been many rail projects implemented over the past several decades, forecasts are very likely more accurate today than they were a few decades ago, barring the fact that forecasting always has a margin of error anyways. This article is important to keep in mind when researching statistics and funding sources for rail projects so that you keep an objective view of the project.